Abstract-Sensitivity analysis attacks constitute a powerful family of watermark "removal" attacks. They exploit vulnerability in some watermarking protocols: the attacker's unlimited access to the watermark detector. This paper proposes a mathematical framework for designing sensitivity analysis attacks and focuses on additive spread-spectrum embedding schemes. The detectors under attack range in complexity from basic correlation detectors to normalized correlation detectors and maximum-likelihood (ML) detectors. The new algorithms precisely estimate and then eliminate the watermark from the watermarked signal. This is accomplished by exploiting geometric properties of the detection boundary and the information leaked by the detector. Several important extensions are presented, including the case of a partially unknown detection function, and the case of constrained detector inputs. In contrast with previous art, our algorithms are noniterative and require, at most, ( ) detection operations in order to precisely estimate the watermark, where is the dimension of the signal. The cost of each detection operation is ( ); hence, the algorithms can be executed in quadratic time. The method is illustrated with an application to image watermarking using an ML detector based on a generalized Gaussian model for images.
I. INTRODUCTION

C
OPYRIGHT protection of digital media, together with related applications, has fueled the development of watermarking systems. In many of these applications, security (i.e., the ability to resist intentional attacks) is a core requirement. In this paper, new attacks on spread-spectrum (SS) schemes are presented. They belong to a family of attacks called "sensitivity analysis attacks" which are known to be extremely effective for an adversary that has unlimited access to the watermark detector [1] - [9] . In this sense, these attacks are analogous to chosen-cyphertext attacks in cryptography, where the opponent has access to the decryption device but does not know the key [10] . The goal is the unauthorized removal of a watermark.
A scenario that is vulnerable to such attacks is when media players accept both watermarked and unwatermarked copies Our approach: the algorithm is noniterative and applies to a broad family of regular detectors. The pirated copy is constructed in the final step of the algorithm, and triggers the response "0" from the detector. [3] . Such devices play watermarked commercial digital products as well as unwatermarked products, such as home videos. An attacker may then be motivated to remove the watermark from a watermarked copy available to him in order to produce an unlimited number of illegal copies and resell them. Moreover, in a typical copyright protection watermarking system, the detection algorithm is publicly known. While no one should be able to "remove" the electronic watermark, anyone can detect its presence. In sensitivity analysis attacks, this feature is abused (refer to Fig. 1 ). The attacker makes use of the detector to extract information about the watermark and subsequently "remove" it. The attacker's goal is to create a pirated copy that is perceptually similar to the original watermarked signal and does not trigger a positive response from the detector. Hence, there is no need to completely remove the watermark: fooling the detector is enough [4] . Sensitivity analysis attacks have been previously addressed by Cox and Linnartz in [1] , by Linnartz and Van Dijk [2] , by Kalker et al. [3] , by Tewfik and Mansour [5] and [6] , and by Comesãna et al. [8] .
To our knowledge, Cox and Linnartz [1] were the first to study this problem. They argued that with the aid of a watermark detector and a size-watermarked image , the attacker should be able to estimate the watermark after and not calls to the detector. Note that sensitivity analysis attacks are only possible because of the repetitive use of the detector. Therefore, if the detection operation itself is of complexity (because the detector computes, for example, a correlation statistic), then the attack method is effectively of complexity . The attack method in [1] is described at a high level. The attack progressively modifies the watermarked signal into one that is just on the negative side of the decision boundary. For each pixel at a time, the luminance is changed until the detector response changes from watermarked to unwatermarked. At the end of this process, the attacker has a collection of the pixels that largely influence the detector's decision. A correlation-type detector is assumed although it is claimed that the attack is still possible with other detectors. In this paper, we explicitly state the steps required by our proposed algorithms to obtain an estimate of the watermark for various detection methods.
For another approach 1 suggested in [2] by Linnartz and Van Dijk, the preliminary step is also to find a signal almost on the decision boundary (see Fig. 2 ). Indeed the basic idea of this approach is to move in the plane tangent to the decision boundary toward . For a correlation detector, the decision boundary is a hyperplane orthogonal to the watermark which can then be estimated and "removed." For other types of detectors, the attack algorithm requires more iterations.
Another attack algorithm was proposed in [3] by Kalker et al. Their algorithm is specialized to normalized correlation detectors, is iterative, and considers only bipolar watermarks.
Later, Tewfik and Mansour [6] used the least mean squares (LMS) algorithm to estimate the watermark. For this purpose, the attack requires a sufficient number of signals on the decision boundary. However, the convergence properties of this method remain to be investigated. In the same paper, the authors recommend processing the detection boundary to make it fractal like. This is addressed in another paper by the same authors [5] . According to [5] , this new boundary cannot be reliably estimated because it is nonparametric.
Finally, another attack was proposed recently by Comesãna et al. in [8] . This attack also uses a numerical method in order to create an unwatermarked signal with minimum Euclidean distortion relative to the watermarked signal originally available 1 For convenience, this algorithm is denoted as Linnartz's algorithm.
to the attacker. The numerical method used in [8] is an adaptation of Newton's method. It is an iterative algorithm, and its computational complexity and convergence properties are currently unknown.
In this paper, we present new algorithms for sensitivity analysis attacks. Table I summarizes the advantages of our new algorithms over the algorithms cited before. The main idea is to exploit the mathematical properties of the detection function and accordingly process the information leaked by the detector to estimate the watermark. For this reason, we study in this paper, two general classes of detectors and generate a sensitivity analysis attack algorithm for each class. We first study generalized correlator detectors and provide an algorithm that estimates the watermark in steps. Popular detectors in this class are the standard correlation detector, the normalized correlation detector, and the Patchwork detector. Next, we address a broader class of nonlinear detectors, which we call regular detectors. Assuming that the detection boundary is smooth enough, the algorithm locally approximates it by an -dimensional hyperplane and obtains the watermark in steps. This class includes a variety of maximum-likelihood (ML) detectors (e.g., based on generalized Gaussian models for the discrete cosine transform (DCT) coefficients of the host image [11] ) In all cases, precise estimates of the watermark are obtained after a fixed number of steps.
Next, we study the scenario when a finite set of parameters, such as the threshold of the test, or parameters of the ML detector, are unknown to the attacker. We modify our algorithms to fit this scenario and we show that their complexity does not increase significantly. Finally, we take into account practical constraints that may be imposed on the detector's input and, consequently, on the attack algorithm. This paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the notation used in this paper. Section III presents the assumptions made about the attacker. Section IV presents a new algorithm that recovers the exact watermark in steps when the detection statistic is the correlation between the signal and the watermark or a function of it. In Section V, another algorithm is derived that applies to the family of regular detectors. Section VI considers parametric detectors, where the attacker does not know some of parameters of the detection function. In Section VII, we take into account the constraints that result when the detector's inputs are digital images. In Section VIII, we present simulation results to ascertain the performance of our algorithms. Finally, conclusions are presented in Section IX.
II. DEFINITIONS AND NOTATION
All of the signals are represented as -dimensional vectors. We denote by the zero vector. Let be the original signal, the watermarked signal, and the watermark, an arbitrary element of . Let be the strength parameter. The watermarked signal is obtained by additive spread-spectrum embedding of the watermark into the original signal 2 (1) For simplicity, assume and let the strength of embedding be represented in the magnitude of the watermark .
The detection threshold is . Given a signal , the detector computes a detection statistic . Then, the detector compares with . The decision is
Given , the set of all such that is the acceptance region of the test; the complementary region is the rejection region.
III. ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE ATTACKER
The attacker knows the detection function and all of the system parameters, including the threshold . He knows neither the watermark nor the detection statistic for any test signal . However, he has unlimited access to the detector and has access to a watermarked signal . Therefore, he can design signals and observe the corresponding binary decision in (2) . (Section VI extends the algorithm to the case of parametric detectors with unknown parameters including ).
The attack methods derived in Sections IV and V rely on the following subproblem.
• Given a signal and a direction , the attacker needs to estimate a scalar such that the signal is on the detection boundary (i.e.,
). In general, we may write , where the domain of the function is a subset of . Consider, for instance, the correlation statistic , then is defined for all and , except on a set of measure zero.
To evaluate , the attacker may use any convenient search algorithm, for example, a binary search. Due to the finite number of steps of the search algorithm, the value of obtained is not exactly . More accurately, if lies in an interval of 2 In fact, the watermark estimation methods studied in this work do not require knowledge of the embedding rule. Instead of (1), one could use an adaptive spread-spectrum rule, in which the strength varies locally depending on local signal characteristics; or one could apply suitable preprocessing to the host s in order to reduce host-signal interference during detection [4] , [12] . The watermark removal step, however, depends on the embedding rule.
width , the minimum number of iterations needed in order to estimate with precision is
The attacker's goal is to produce an estimate of and create the pirated copy
The mean-squared distortion of the pirated copy relative to the host signal is . However, recall that the attacker does not know , and only has access to . Since should be perceptually similar to , the attacker may use as an indicator of the perceptual quality of .
IV. GENERALIZED CORRELATOR DETECTOR
The new approach directly exploits the underlying structure of the detection boundary to estimate the watermark. In Sections IV-A and IV-B, the simple correlation detection method is used (5) Then, the detection boundary is an -dimensional plane orthogonal to the watermark vector . In particular, Patchwork [13] is an additive spread-spectrum embedding scheme with a correlation detection method and the algorithms in Sections IV-A and IV-B can be used to defeat it. In Sections IV-C and IV-D, extensions of the basic detection method in (5) are investigated, including normalized correlators and nonlinear prewhitening correlators.
While deriving the new attack algorithm, several cases should be considered according to the conditions imposed on the detector input. This yields slightly different algorithms.
A. Unconstrained Detector Input
In the simplest setup, there is no constraint on the input to the detector. In this case, the attacker selects a set of orthonormal vectors . Let be the watermark component along the unit vector . From (5), we have (6) Hence, the attacker just needs to estimate , the correlation statistic for each . For this purpose, it suffices to identify the vector at the intersection of the radial line in direction and the decision boundary (refer to Fig. 3 ). As described in Section III, is obtained as . By the linearity property of the dot product, we have and, therefore, from (6), we obtain (7) By executing sufficiently many binary search steps, the attacker obtains an estimate of the watermark vector with any desired precision. Note that the watermarked signal is not needed at all in this algorithm.
B. Constrained Detector Input
Often, the input to the detector must belong to a bounded region which is a subset of the Euclidean space , as in the case for digitized images or audio. The watermarked signal itself lives in this region. This may preclude using arbitrary orthonormal vectors as test signals as was done in Section IV-A. Therefore, we need a modified strategy for selecting the test signals.
For simplicity, we assume that is a star-shaped region 3
The attacker selects a set of orthonormal vectors . He now uses the watermarked signal to create an auxiliary signal that is not on the decision boundary. Actually, is constructed as a scaled version of , where . By our assumption (8), we have . Then, the scale factor is selected such that , defined below, is on the detection boundary (refer to Fig. 3 )
where is defined in Section III. This is done for every . If is selected inside but far enough from the boundary of , it is guaranteed that the signals will belong to (see Fig. 3 ). Using the linearity property of the dot product again, (6), (9a), and (9c) imply (10) Moreover, from (5), we have (11) (11) into (10), we obtain This is a linear system of equations with unknowns. Normally, solving such a system would require operations. However, the special structure of this system reduces the number of operations to , as shown below. From (10), we have (12) Multiplying both sides of this equation by , summing from 1 to , and substituting the sum into the right side of (11), we obtain (13) which yields the value of the correlation statistic (14) Hence, the attacker first uses (14) to compute , then (12) to compute for and, finally, obtains . The algorithm is summarized in Table II . After steps, an estimate of the watermark is obtained and is used to construct the pirated copy as indicated in Section III. Note that the attacker's unlimited access to the detector is what enables him to estimate the scale factors , . As explained in Section III, the binary search algorithm can be used for this purpose. If lies in an interval of width , the minimum number of iterations needed in order to estimate with precision is in (3). Hence, the algorithm requires detection operations in order to estimate the watermark. However, the detection operation itself has linear complexity in , the length of the signal . Therefore, the algorithm has complexity. Moreover, the algorithm is noniterative in the sense that in order to estimate with precision and, hence, , operations are required exactly.
C. Function of the Correlation Statistic
Let us consider the following detection statistic: (15) where is a general function mapping to . In other words, affects the detector output only via the scalar quantity . Note that since is known to the attacker, he can view as a function of the scalar unknown . We assume that is invertible for the test signals defined in (9a), and denote by the inverse function. Of course, the simple correlation statistic used earlier in this section is a particular case of (15), with . Another particular case is the normalized correlation statistic [4] , which is used in Kalker's algorithm [3] (16) where the function is invertible for all , with . This is true if is known to the attacker. If this is not the case, then redefine the detection function as (17) and let the threshold be . Again, this function belongs to the family of detection functions considered in this section. However, the threshold is unknown to the attacker, a scenario studied in Section VI and proven not to affect the complexity of the attack.
We now ask: under which conditions can the watermark be restored in detection operations. The attacker creates a signal anywhere in except and the decision boundary. Then, similar to the algorithm proposed in Section IV-B, he constructs signals , , on the decision boundary (i.e., ). Using (6), (9b), and (15) , and the linearity of the dot product, we obtain (18)
The equations given in (18) form a nonlinear system in unknowns. The system can, however, be transformed into a linear system under the invertibility assumption on above. From (18), we obtain This system can be solved similarly to that in Section IV-B and, therefore, an estimate of the watermark is obtained in steps, and detection operations.
D. Nonlinear "Prewhitened" Correlator
In this section, we study a class of detectors that attempt to remove host signal interference prior to correlation with the watermark [14] . First, the detector estimates the host signal by , then it subtracts the estimate from before correlating with . The detection function is
If the estimator is linear in , the detection function in (19) is reduced to where the superscript denotes the matrix transpose.
By our assumptions in Section III, the attacker knows the matrix . He may use the algorithm described in Section IV-B to estimate as . If is invertible, the estimate of is obtained as More generally, if the estimator is nonlinear, the detection function in (19) takes the form (20) where is a nonlinear transformation, known to the attacker. Consider the case when is invertible. In order to obtain an estimate for the watermark , signals are generated on the detection boundary (21) The attacker generates, for each , a new signal such that the inverse signal is on the detection boundary. A slight variation of the mapping defined in Section III is used to evaluate the scalar (22) The system (22) can be solved using the algorithm of Section IV-B.
V. REGULAR DETECTORS
In this section, the vulnerability of general decision rules to sensitivity analysis attacks is investigated. For this purpose, detection statistics other than the simple correlation statistic and its extensions and considered in Section IV are addressed. In particular, we assume that the detection boundary satisfies second-order regularity conditions and can be locally approximated by a hyperplane. Under these regularity conditions, we are still able to produce an accurate estimate of the watermark in quadratic time.
A. Assumptions on Detector
Let us consider the general decision statistic , and define the gradient mapping as follows:
Our first assumption is (8): the feasible region for the detector input is star-shaped. Assume that the watermark , the watermarked signal , and the scaled signal defined in (25) below satisfy the following properties: A1) (i.e., the origin belongs to the rejection region and the watermarked signal to the acceptance region). A2) exists such that is twice continuously differentiable in the -dimensional -ball of radius centered at Moreover, the absolute eigenvalues of the Hessian are upperbounded by (24) for all . (Note that generally depends on , , and .) A3) exists such that the gradient mapping of (23) is invertible over the -ball of radius centered at
B. Algorithm
By our assumptions in Section III, the attacker knows the function and the threshold . Given the watermarked signal , he may then implement the following steps. This is possible because of (A1) and our assumption (8) that the region is star shaped.
2) Select an orthonormal set of vectors and small positive numbers . For each , if needed, flip the sign of such that the signal (27) lies in the acceptance region (see Fig. 4 ). This signal is scaled to produce a signal on the detection boundary (28) (29) Observe that because is in the rejection region and is in the acceptance region. For small enough, the signals will also be in , and will be close to 1. Therefore, potential ties (in case the equation defining has multiple solutions) are broken by choosing closest to 1. By assumption A3), the watermark is recoverable from the gradient vector . Denoting the inverse function by and using
, we obtain
At this point, the attacker has selected and evaluated . Using (36), he can now estimate the components of Since the attacker knows the mapping , he can numerically solve (38) for . Then, he can obtain from (36) and from (37).
It should be noted that (38) may be hard to solve and may have more than one solution, depending on the nature of the detection statistic . Moreover, unless the decision boundary is a hyperplane in the neighborhood of , the local linearization (32) is only an approximation. Yet as illustrated in Section VIII-C, by selecting appropriate scalars , the watermark can be almost exactly estimated. Table III summarizes the steps of the algorithm.
Finally, we comment on the complexity of this algorithm. As mentioned before, the scalars used by the algorithm are , , and for . First, the attacker estimates the scalar by the binary search algorithm with precision . Then, he sets the magnitude of the scalars to a small value. Their signs are selected such that belongs to the acceptance region. Next, the scalars for are estimated in a similar way to . The required number of steps for each estimation is Therefore, the algorithm requires detection operations. Since each such operation is linear in , the dimension of the signal, the algorithm has complexity. Moreover, the algorithm is noniterative, since a good estimate of the watermark is obtained exactly after detection operations.
C. Application to Generalized Gaussian Hosts
Let us apply the algorithm of Section V-B to ML detectors, assuming that the host signal is distributed according to the generalized Gaussian distribution (GGD) where is a scale parameter, and is a normalizing constant. Given an input signal , the log likelihood ratio statistic, scaled by , is equal to (39)
In (39), and are the components of . This detector was first used for watermark detection by Hernández et al. [15] .
We assume that , so assumption (8) where (for small ), the probability that or is very small. Note that is an auxiliary signal on the decision boundary. If for this signal, and/or are too low (i.e., is too high), the attack may fail (i.e., not result in a pirated copy ). In this case, the attacker can just generate another signal 5 on the decision boundary. Hence, A2) is satisfied with high probability.
Therefore, in cases where all of the assumptions are satisfied, the algorithm is used to generate the signal and the scalars and , are described in Section V-A. Equation (42) gives the expression of the th watermark component in terms of the th gradient component . From (36), we obtain an approximation for . Substituting (36) into (42) and using the fact that signal lies on the boundary, we obtain (43) where we have defined (44) We are interested in studying the existence and the number of roots of the equation . 5 For instance, a random vector v can be added to x, and the algorithm of Table III is applied to x + v. . In (36) and (40), we obtain . The next step of the attacker is to use this in (36) in order to estimate the components . Next, (42) is used to estimate the components of for . In summary, the watermark is recovered in steps. Using this estimate, the attacker computes the pirated copy using (4).
In the general case when the threshold is , the roots of the equation are and as shown in Fig. 5 . Since and are continuous functions of , is always the root that should be selected by the attacker. Note that if , the equation no longer has roots.
VI. PARAMETRIC DETECTORS
As stated in Section III, the threshold, the detection function, and all of its parameters are known to the attacker who uses this knowledge together with his access to the detector in order to estimate . Some schemes attempt to improve security by keeping a few parameters secret. Intuitively, we cannot expect such an approach to be successful. In this section, we extend the algorithms of Sections IV and V to defeat such schemes. The complexity of the algorithms is not significantly increased.
A. Unknown Threshold
We begin by showing that keeping the value of the threshold secret does not make the watermarking scheme more secure.
1) Generalized Correlator Detector:
As in Section IV, the main idea of sensitivity analysis attacks is to make use of the unlimited access to the detector in order to obtain information about the watermark . This is accomplished by creating auxiliary signals on the detection boundary, resulting in an system of equations of the form (45) The unknowns are the vector and the parameter .
2) Claim 1: If is a solution of the system (45), then so is for any . Therefore, the attacker cannot recover the exact watermark and threshold. In fact, the attacker is not concerned about the threshold, he is only interested in producing a good estimate of the watermark and a good signal in the rejection region. Although the threshold is unknown, the attacker can still estimate the watermark up to a scalar.
Define the normalized watermark
Then, (45) may be viewed as a linear system of equations in the unknowns ,
This is exactly the same problem as the one considered in Section IV-B, with a threshold equal to 1. From (12) and (14), we obtain as follows:
Having , we can construct the projection of the watermarked signal onto the boundary. Since is orthogonal to the boundary, we have for some constant Since is on the boundary, we also have Therefore, the projection of the watermarked signal on the boundary is given by
3) Host Available at the Detector:
In the analysis we made so far, we assumed blind detection. It turns out that the case when the host signal is available at the detector is just the same as the case of blind detection with an unknown threshold considered in this section. Assume again that the detector is the correlation detector. If the detector knows the host , the test takes the form which is equivalent to where . Both the host signal and the watermark are unknown to the attacker; therefore, is unknown to him also, and we are back to the problem of the previous section: estimate the watermark in case of blind correlation detection and unknown parameter .
4) Regular Detectors:
The family of regular detectors was introduced in Section V. Here, we have to estimate two unknowns and . Therefore, we need one more equation in addition to (38). For this purpose, an auxiliary signal is generated from the watermarked signal on the decision boundary (47) We can solve for by subtracting (47) from (38) and finding the root of the equation (48) Next, we substitute the estimated into (38) and obtain an estimate of . Recall from Section V-C that for GGD hosts with , the detector is a correlator and the boundary is a hyperplane, 6 and the gradient in (40) is equal to . Therefore, the magnitude of is proportional to and the attacker knows the watermark up to its magnitude [see (36)]. But neither nor are recoverable by Claim 1. In this case, any is a valid root for (48) as expected. The attacker can also follow the method in Section VI-A.I for an estimate of the direction of .
B. General Parametric Detector
In this section, we give the general steps for a sensitivity analysis attack with unknown parameters. Let be the -length vector of parameters. The threshold may be one of these parameters. The detection function depends on . Denote the difference between this function and as , where is the input to the detector and is the watermark. Therefore, the decision boundary is given by the equation . If the parameter vector was known by the attacker, one of the algorithms described in Sections IV and V could be used to estimate the watermark by generating signals, and on the detection boundary. When is unknown in addition to the watermark , the attacker can just generate additional signals , , on the detection boundary, i.e.,
where . For any candidate -vector , an estimate of the watermark 7 can be obtained using one of the algorithms in Sections IV and V. Let be this estimate. We propose the following strategy for the attacker: find that minimizes the cost function (50) Then, the attacker's estimate of the watermark is . According to the theory of Sections IV and V, can, in principle, be a perfect estimate of the watermark (i.e., ). Then, the cost function in (50) is minimized at [i.e., due to (49)]. If the cost function admits a single global minimum, then coincides with , and the attacker's strategy is guaranteed to recover the watermark. In practice, the cost function may have multiple local minima, so we use a multistart optimization procedure to seek a global minimum. 8 Note that in practice, the signals and may not be exactly on the detection boundary but very close to it. For this reason and because of the nonperfect accuracy of the algorithms of Sections IV and V, is only approximately equal to .
In order to illustrate this method, we will consider the GGD detector of (39) in Section V-C with the fixed coefficient and threshold . The watermarked signal has length . Fig. 6 illustrates the case when and both and are unknown to the attacker ( ). The cost function is minimized at and . If only one of these parameters was unknown to the attacker, then is 7 Not necessarily a good estimate if differs from . 8 Depending on the nature of the cost function, the global minimum may or may not be found by the optimization algorithm. equal to one ( or ) and the minimization problem is one dimensional; hence, simpler. To the left of Fig. 7 , the cost function is shown when is the only unknown parameter. Similarly, the cost function is presented to the right of Fig. 7 . Note that the sharpness of the minimum of the cost function increases with .
In conclusion, the algorithm succeeds in obtaining a perfect estimate of since the cost function is minimized at . The estimated normalized threshold is instead of . Observe that the purpose of the attacker is to estimate the watermark. The threshold is only used to solve for the parameter in (38). For , the solution to (43) is , while for , it is . The normalized correlation between the watermark and the estimated watermark is equal to 0.988 for and to 0.983 for . Fig. 8 shows that is quite high for a wide range of .
VII. QUANTIZATION EFFECTS
In order to estimate the watermark , the attacker uses the watermarked signal to create new signals such as , , and , , constructed in Sections IV and V. In practice, the detector's input signals are restricted to a region ; therefore, the newly created signals have also to belong to . In order to illustrate the concepts, we consider JPEG [16] . In JPEG image compression, the DCT coefficients of an image are scaled, quantized with integer accuracy, and encoded. Once quantized, these coefficients become integers in the range . So in this case, the region is , the intersection of the lattice with the hypercube
Depending on the detection function, a suitable attack algorithm is picked from Sections IV and V and is applied to the quantized, scaled DCT coefficients of the image, components of the signal . Although it might appear that these restrictions make the attacker's task harder, our algorithms can be modified to satisfy these input constraints. The effects of this modification on the performance depend on the nature of the constraints. We first assume that the restriction region is bounded but still connected. Later, we add the constraint of being discrete also. Due to a lack of space, we will briefly illustrate the main results (see Table IV ). For details, please refer to [9] .
In Section IV-B, we described how the basic correlation detector can be modified to account for the constraint that the input belongs to a star-shaped region. A similar extension applies to the generalized correlation detectors of Sections IV-C and IV-D [9] . When we have the additional constraint that the inputs are vectors of integers (i.e., is discrete), all of the auxiliary signals needed by the algorithms of Section IV are quantized to have integer components. Due to quantization, some of these signals may even lie outside the region (i.e., have a magnitude larger than 1023). Let be the index set of the auxiliary signals that belong to . Still, these signals might not be in . In this case, they are approximated by signals in closest to them and only the watermark components with are estimated using (12) . The estimates of the other components are set to zero. Although the attacker may not obtain a perfect estimate of , he may still succeed in removing the watermark resulting in a signal in the rejection region and with good perceptual quality as shown in Section VIII. Note that as the quantization gets finer, it is more likely that all auxiliary signals lie in .
In the more general case of a regular detector, the main idea of the algorithm is to find a signal on the detection boundary, and signals and in a small neighborhood of so that the detection boundary in this neighborhood can be approximated by a hyperplane. The construction of these signals is not affected when boundedness is imposed on the signals input to the de- tector and, hence, there is no loss in the performance of the algorithm. The case requiring these signals to take integer values needs further study in order to justify the approximation of the region occupied by the signals and by a hyperplane.
VIII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we verify the effectiveness of our algorithms by applying them to the three grayscale JPEG images of Fig. 9 .
• The 256 256 Lena image.
• A 128 128 image, cropped from the original Lena image.
• A 64 64 image, also cropped from Lena. The quantized DCT coefficients are in the range . We assume that the detector accepts only images in JPEG format. Additional implementation details can be found in [9] .
A. Watermark Embedding
In the previous sections, all of the signals, including the watermark, were treated as length vectors for mathematical convenience. To describe the simulation results, it is more convenient to use a 2-D representation. In JPEG compression, the image is divided into 8 8 blocks, and the 2-D DCT transform of each block is quantized and encoded. We select 13 midfrequencies for watermark embedding, as depicted in Fig. 10 . In each block, seven components are chosen randomly and are sampled from with equal probability. The remaining six components are sampled from also with equal probability. Note that the norms are the same for all watermarks gener- ated in this way. In particular, the energy per nonzero watermark component is fixed and is equal to 18.7692.
B. Correlation Detector
First, we study the simple correlation detector of (5). The results of the algorithm are illustrated in Table V , where denotes the number of watermarked pixels in the image. The embedding distortion per sample is the attack distortion per sample is and the distortion between the pirated copy and the original signal per sample is
The normalized correlation between the original watermark and the estimated one is given as Finally, the detection coefficients and [see (5)] corresponding to the original unwatermarked signal and the estimated signal are denoted by and , respectively.
The algorithm of Section IV-B was modified as described in Section VII and used to attack these images. Table V shows the results of four experiments using four different realization of the random watermark, and three different image sizes. We note from the first three rows of Table V that the algorithm succeeds at exactly estimating the original image with perfect correlation between the actual watermark and the estimated one . However, as mentioned in Section VII, since the feasible region is discrete, the algorithm is not always guaranteed to produce a perfect estimate of the watermark. The fourth row shows an example where the algorithm cannot recover the original image exactly. For 7168 components of the auxiliary signal , the corresponding signals lie outside the feasible region and, hence, are not valid inputs to the detector. However, one should note that while the algorithm did not manage to completely remove the watermark and recover the original signal , the estimated watermark is very close to the original one . Moreover, the constructed signal lies in the rejection region and is perceptually similar to the original signal (see the last row of Table V) . Therefore, the algorithm succeeds at "removing" the watermark. Moreover, the algorithm's complexity is truly , as evidenced by the excellent linear least-squares fit of running time to . The difference in execution time for the last two rows of Table V is due to the fact that in the last row, the algorithm required 7168 fewer iterations. To see which case is more typical, we ran 120 independent experiments and observed that for 93.33% of these experiments, the correlation between the true and estimated watermarks was greater than 0.93.
C. ML Detector With Generalized Gaussian Host Model
Next, we consider the GGD detector of (39). We apply the attack algorithm of Section V-C to our three test images. The results are shown in Table VI. The threshold is zero and the detector uses fixed parameter . The nonzero root of (44) is given by in Table VI . The value of the scalars in (27) is set to 0.05. Note that the normalized correlation is almost equal to one, despite the nonexactness of (38). However, with , our algorithm is less stable: is in the order of 0.8 for the 128 128 image and 0.7 for the 256 256 one. In fact, should be neither too large nor too small. On one hand, small is desirable to justify the linearization implicit in (32). On the other hand, if is too small, other approximation errors will be amplified because is in the denominator of (38).
Therefore, the algorithm produces an almost perfect estimate of the watermark and succeeds at "removing" it by generating TABLE VI  RESULTS FOR ATTACKS ON ML DETECTOR USING GGD HOST SIGNAL MODEL   TABLE VII  ALGORITHM TO USE DEPENDING ON THE DETECTION FUNCTION an image perceptually similar to the original image in the rejection region. Note that this algorithm is slower than the correlation detection algorithm because of the more complex nature of the detector. The algorithm is still of order .
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we considered sensitivity analysis attacks on additive spread-spectrum schemes. In such attacks, the attacker benefits from the availability of a watermarked signal and a watermark detector. By probing the detector repetitively, his goal is to derive a new signal that "fools" the detector with minimum possible distortion to . We derived new sensitivity attack algorithms that exploit the nature of the detection method and reliably estimate the watermark (refer to Table VII). Once the watermark is estimated, it is "removed" by inverting the embedding function. The set of detection methods vulnerable to such attacks is quite wide. It includes the simple correlation detection method, the normalized correlation detection method, the Patchwork method, the generalized Gaussian host detection method, and any other method that obeys the assumptions specified in Sections IV and V. We also considered the case when a finite number of parameters is unknown by the attacker and showed that this does not improve the security of the watermarking scheme. Most often, only detection operations are required to break these schemes whether these parameters are known or not by the attacker. We have also extended our basic algorithms so that they can cope with restrictions on input signals that are commonly encountered. For instance, the signals are restricted to bounded regions in Euclidean space, and subject to quantization constraints.
The results of this paper establish the lack of security of one of the most used embedding schemes (additive spread spectrum) and several of its variations. In contrast, high-dimensional quantization index modulation schemes (QIM) with randomized lattices present great challenges to attackers [17] . The potential vulnerability of constrained QIM schemes (e.g., scalar QIM) is a topic of current research [8] .
APPENDIX
The derivations of Step 3) in Section V-B are given here. For each , using Taylor's remainder theorem, we expand the function around
where and owing to assumption A2). For small enough , the second-order terms in (51) can be neglected.
Applying the triangle inequality to (35), we obtain (52)
When tends to zero, the signal in (27) converges to and, consequently, converges to 1. With (52), converges to zero also. Therefore, is made small enough by selecting arbitrarily small . Taking this into consideration and substituting (26) and (29) into (51), we obtain (53)
Neglecting the higher-order terms in (51) is equivalent to locally approximating the decision boundary in the neighborhood of the signals and , , by a hyperplane as shown in (32). 
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